Douceur, John R. (2002) The Sybil Attack. In: Peer-to-Peer Systems, First International Workshop, Cambridge, MA, USA.
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Abstract
Large-scale peer-to-peer systems face security threats from faulty or hostile remote computing elements. To resist these threats, many such systems employ redundancy. However, if a single faulty entity can present multiple identities, it can control a substantial fraction of the system, thereby undermining this redundancy. One approach to preventing these “Sybil attacks” is to have a trusted agency certify identities. This paper shows that, without a logically centralized authority, Sybil attacks are always possible except under extreme and unrealistic assumptions of resource parity and coordination among entities.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Projects > BloSSom 2019 Main Topics > Distributed Systems Main Topics > Security Main Topics > Theory |
| Divisions: | Computer Science |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email richard.dabels@uni-rostock.de |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Sep 2019 16:32 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Sep 2019 16:32 |
| URI: | http://blossom.informatik.uni-rostock.de/id/eprint/54 |
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