Abramowicz, Michael (2016) CRYPTOCURRENCY-BASED LAW. Arizona Law Review 2016. pp. 359-420.
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Abstract
Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer institution—an alternative to a central bank. The decisions made through this protocol, however, involve no judgment. Could a peer-to-peer protocol underpin an institution that makes normative decisions? Indeed, an extension to the Bitcoin protocol could allow a cryptocurrency to make law. Tacit coordination games, in which players compete to identify consensus issue resolutions, would determine currency ownership. For example, an issue might be whether a cryptocurrency-based trust should disburse funds to a putative beneficiary, and the game’s outcome would resolve the question and result in gains or losses for coordination game participants. A cryptocurrency can also be used to generate rules or other written codes. Peer-to-peer law might be useful when official decision-makers are corrupt or when agency or transactions costs are high. A modest starting point for cryptocurrency-based governance would be as a replacement for Bitcoin’s centralized system for changing its source code. A cryptocurrency incorporating tacit coordination games could serve as a foundation for other projects requiring peer-to-peer governance, ranging from arbitration to business associations, which would enjoy inherent limited liability and would lack designated management.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Main Topics > Bitcoin Projects > BloSSom 2019 Main Topics > Economy Main Topics > Law |
| Divisions: | Law |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email richard.dabels@uni-rostock.de |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Sep 2019 16:32 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Sep 2019 16:32 |
| URI: | http://blossom.informatik.uni-rostock.de/id/eprint/8 |
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